@article{Lock_D-2023_141883,
title = {Delegated legislation in the pandemic: further limits of a constitutional bargain revealed},
author = {Lock, D. and Londras, F. and Grez Hidalgo, P.},
month = {jun},
year = {2023},
abstract = {The challenge that delegated legislation poses to parliamentary sovereignty and associated supremacy in the UK is purportedly addressed through what we term the 'constitutional bargain of delegated law-making'. This has three elements: the proper limitation of delegation by Parliament through well-designed parent legislation, the exercise of self-restraint by the Executive in the use of delegated authority, and the enablement of meaningful scrutiny by Parliament. As a paradigm situation in which delegated law-making might be said to be necessary, the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic is an apposite context in which to assess the robustness of that bargain. Our analysis uses a sample of Westminster-generated pandemic-related secondary instruments as a peephole into the broader dynamics of this constitutional bargain and further reveals its significant frailties; frailties that are exposed, but not created, by the pandemic.},
journal = {Legal Studies},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
url = {https://publichealthscotland.scot/id/141883},
}
