Abstract

The challenge that delegated legislation poses to parliamentary sovereignty and associated supremacy in the UK is purportedly addressed through what we term the 'constitutional bargain of delegated law-making'. This has three elements: the proper limitation of delegation by Parliament through well-designed parent legislation, the exercise of self-restraint by the Executive in the use of delegated authority, and the enablement of meaningful scrutiny by Parliament. As a paradigm situation in which delegated law-making might be said to be necessary, the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic is an apposite context in which to assess the robustness of that bargain. Our analysis uses a sample of Westminster-generated pandemic-related secondary instruments as a peephole into the broader dynamics of this constitutional bargain and further reveals its significant frailties; frailties that are exposed, but not created, by the pandemic.

Cite as

Lock, D., Londras, F. & Grez Hidalgo, P. 2023, 'Delegated legislation in the pandemic: further limits of a constitutional bargain revealed', Legal Studies. https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/86151/

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Last updated: 18 July 2023
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